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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, many governments have increased their reliance on public-private
partnerships (PPP) to nance the acquisition of infrastructure assets and the operation
of their facilities. A frequent form of PPP is the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession
under which the private sector builds and operates an infrastructure project for a well
dened concession period and then transfers it to public authorities. In a majority of
cases, such concession contracts have been used to nance transport infrastructure such
as highways, tunnels, airports, ports, bridges, canals, railroads and railway transport sys-
tems. They are also frequently used to nance projects in power generation, water supply,
dams, irrigation, sewerage and drainage, and to a lesser extent, solid waste management
and telecommunications infrastructure. Despite their popularity and practical relevance,
few academic works have studied BOT concessions. This paper intends to ll this gap by
o¤ering a theoretically investigation of these contracts.
The attractiveness of BOT concessions to governments and politicians stems from the
possibility to limit government spending by shifting investment costs to private interests.
Historically, the rst BOT concessions were granted for the construction of turnpike roads
in the UK in 1660, at a time of industrial expansion and embryonic public nances.
Additional BOT concessions quickly followed for the construction and operation of canal
and railway projects in both the UK and the US. In the water sector, the rst French
BOT concession was granted to the Périer Brothers in 1782 to pump and supply water to
the city of Paris. It was quickly followed by similar concessions in France, Spain, Italy,
Belgium, and Germany. The need to resort to private investors has been even more acute
for international projects that require important funding commitments and challenging
coordination amongst nations. This is the case of the Suez Canal and Channel Tunnel
projects, which construction and operation were privately nanced by the Suez Canal
Company in 1859 and the Eurotunnel Group in 1988, respectively.
To induce private investors to sink their capital into very expensive and risky in-
frastructure projects, governments must leave rents to the concession holders during their
activities. In the 17th and 18th centuries, many concessions were unregulated so that con-
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cession holders were given monopoly rights over their infrastructure. For example, some
canal concession holders retained exclusive rights on the eet moving on their canals.
Nowadays, even when they are monitored by public authorities, BOT projects confer
temporary control and cashow rights to the private concession holders. The latter are
indeed allowed to ask compensation from the users of the delivered goods or services
and aim not only at recovering their investment costs but also at extracting the high-
est possible prots. Therefore, the choice between a private BOT concession and public
management implies a trade-o¤ between allocative e¢ ciency and the cost of public funds,
which is the focus of this paper.
Among concession contracts, a distinctive feature of BOT concessions lies in the trans-
fer of operational responsibilities and prots to a private concession holder for a well de-
ned time period. Concession periods vary in function of the time required to recover
the assessed costs of the facilities. For example, in the above historical examples, the
Périer Brothers obtained a 15-year concession (Delambre 1818, p. lxiij.), and Suez Canal
Company a 99-year concession. The Eurotunnel Group has (initially) obtained a 55-year
concession (Channel Tunnel Act 1987). As additional examples, the French Millau bridge
was granted a 78-year concession, Australian Darwin-Alice Springs railway concession has
a 50-year duration, the US concessions for the Southern Indiana Toll Interstate 69 and
Trans-Texas road Corridor are granted for 75-year and 50-year (Congressional Budget
O¢ ce 2008). Since concession periods vary with the nature and context of the projects,
the present paper also aims to discuss the optimal concession periods.
Finally BOT concession contracts are close substitutes to build-own-operate-transfer
(BOOT) contracts where the concession holder gets the ownership of the infrastructure
in addition to the tasks to build and operate it. In BOT contracts, the public authority
retains ownership over the infrastructure while it contractually confers all control and
cashow rights to the concession holder (e.g. the above French Millau bridge and US
toll road examples). In BOOT contracts, the authority confers the ownership over the
infrastructure to the private concession holder (e.g. Suez Canal, Channel Tunnel and
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Australian Darwin-Alice Springs railway).4 The choice between one or the other contract
generally depends on the legal system that applies to the project. Nevertheless, from an
economic viewpoint, the two forms of concession contracts are equivalent as long as they
are associated with the same control and cashow rights (Hart 2003). In the sequel, we
will therefore make no formal distinction between BOT and BOOT contracts.
In this paper, we present a simple theory of BOT concessions by considering a single
project that can be implemented by a public rms manager or a private concession
holder. In the case of a publicly owned rm, the government makes the investment
and keeps both cashow and control rights over the infrastructure. The government is,
therefore, accountable for its prots and losses. The government must subsidize the public
rm in the event of losses, whereas it can tax it in the event of prots. In contrast, the
BOT concession combines private and public management. The government auctions the
BOT concession to potential concession candidates, who bid for the shortest concession
period. During the concession period, the winning concession candidate keeps cashow
and control rights so that the government takes no responsibility for the rms prots and
losses. The government therefore makes no cash transfer to concession holders during the
construction and operation periods. The concession holder recoups its investment cost
from the rms prots during the concession period. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
in most of the text that concession holders are allowed to set monopoly prices during the
concession period.5 However our results are robust to the possible existence of a price
cap. Finally, at the end of the concession period, the government recovers the cashow
and control rights and delegates the operation to a public rms manager.6
4From a legal viewpoint, the latter option o¤ers more protection to the concession holder as it limits
the governmentlegal public authority to unilaterally change a concession contract. However, in practice
such unilateral actions are rather unfrequent. We thank the editor for this remark.
5This is congruent with the fact that many outsourced facilities turn out to show excessive usage
prices. See for instance Chong et al. (2006) and Estache (2006).
6In this paper we assume away possible renegotiation of the concession duration for simplicity. In
practice BOT contracts are nevertheless regularly renegotiated (e.g., see Guasch et al , 2008). For
instance, the channel tunnel project was allowed to extent its initial 55-year concession by 10 additional
years (Channel Tunnel Act 1987).
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We discuss the choice of BOT concession contracts for various degrees of information
asymmetry that exist between rms and governments before the concession contract and
for various levels of transferability of project characteristics at the end of the concession
period. Our discussion is structured around two main cases. In the rst case, conces-
sion candidates do not hold any better information about project characteristics before
the concession contract signature (ex-ante information symmetry). As in the examples
of the Suez Canal or Channel Tunnel, public authorities and concession holders may be
equally uncertain about costs and demand prospects. In the second case, concession
candidates hold better information before the concession contract signature (ex-ante in-
formation asymmetry). For instance, many water distribution and sanitation concessions
are held by specialized multinational corporations that have better technology expertise
and project experience than local governments. We then also consider two subcases de-
pending on whether project characteristics may or may not be physically transferred to
public authority at the end of the concession. Indeed those characteristics may result
either from the physical facility that is a transferable good (transferability) or from the
concession holders management that is not transferable to the government (non transfer-
ability).7For example, the expertise and know-how required in sanitation or waste man-
agement projects are not easily transferred to the public local authorities whereas the
cost and demand characteristics are naturally transferred at the end of a canal or tunnel
concession.
In addition, as in La¤ont and Tirole (1993), the governments nancial constraint is
summarized by its shadow cost of public funds, which measures the social cost of its
economic intervention. Transfers to public rms are associated with social costs because
every dollar spent on (re-)funding the project implies a decrease in the production of
essential public goods, schooling, or health care or an increase in distortionary taxation
or costly public debt. This shadow cost is usually high in developing countries that face
7Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Qiu and Wang (2011) also examine how moral hazard is a¤ected by
the transfer of ownership of PPPs from the private to the public sector when concession contracts expire.
They show that the likelihood of maintaining the private owership mitigates moral hazard issues and that
asset specicity and service-demand risk play critical roles.
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structural di¢ culty in raising taxes.8 It is also very much likely to have drastically risen in
many developed economies that face severe budget decits since the 2008 nancial crisis
(e.g. Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, France, the UK, and the US). The paper provides
insights on the impact of the nancial crisis on the enactment of BOT concessions.
The results of the paper are as follows. We rstly show that governments always avoid
BOT concessions when they share the same information as the concession holders. Indeed
public management can always replicate and improve upon the decision of the concession
holder in a context of symmetric information. In contrast to Engel et al. (2007), the
concern for allocative ine¢ ciencies during the BOT concession period makes the shadow
cost of public funds relevant in the BOT decision making. However, the choice between
BOT concession and public management depends on shadow costs of public funds when
some information asymmetry arises between governments and public rm managers after
the investment phase. We highlight two e¤ects. On the one hand, BOT concessions relax
governmentsnancial constraints but involve pricing strategies that decrease consumer
surplus. On the other hand, public management involves nancial costs that are associated
not only with the investment costs but also with the costs of subsidizing the potential
losses of public rms. The latter problem is exacerbated by informational asymmetries
because public managers have incentives to inate their cost reports to increase their
rents. To mitigate such informational costs, governments reduce the output of public
rms and, therefore, incur additional costs in terms of a fall in consumer surplus.
As mentioned above, we consider two cases of information contexts before the signa-
ture of a concession contract. In the rst case, concession candidates do not hold better
information about project characteristics before the concession contract signature (ex-ante
information symmetry). We show that the costs of information asymmetries dominate
for large project uncertainty and large shadow costs of public funds. This suggests that
the reliance on BOT concessions should increase in time of nancial crisis. We also show
that the incentives to choose BOT concessions increase when the project characteristics
8It was also high in O.E.C.D. countries before and during the industrial revolution because governments
had very few funding sources and embryonic taxation systems.
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can be transferred to the public authorities at the end of the concession period. In the
second case, concession candidates hold better information at the time of the contract
signature (ex-ante information asymmetry). We then show that the incentives to choose
BOT concessions can also increase provided governments are able to implement an auc-
tion with the participation of a large enough number of concession candidates. For the
sake of completeness, we also compare the above BOT contracts with a third case the
least-present-value-of-revenue auction that is proposed by Engel et al. (2001). Such an
auction is also preferred only in economies with large enough shadow costs of public funds.
Finally, we use the specic class of linear demand functions and uniform cost distributions
to compute theoretical values of shadow costs of public funds that would entice govern-
ments to choose BOT concession contracts. Comparing those theoretical values with the
empirical values estimated for advanced and developing economies, we nd that BOT
concession contracts are likely to be preferred in many situations.
Finally the model allows us to discuss two interesting extensions. We rst discuss the
impact of price cap regulation during the concession periods and show that appropriate
price caps make BOT contracts more valuable for governments. In a nutshell the intro-
duction of a price cap can reduce the loss of consumer surplus during the concession more
than it increases the cost of a longer concession period. We analyze next the impact of
di¤erent opportunity costs of time for the government and the concession holder. We show
that more impatient governments (i.e., those with shorter tenures) have more incentives
to opt for BOT concessions.
This paper relates to several strands of economic literature. First, there exists a nar-
row strand of literature that is dedicated to the discussion of BOT concession contracts.
By extending early discussions about auctions of natural monopolies (Williamson, 1976;
Riordan and Sappington, 1987), a recent literature in this area has focused on the op-
timal way to auction monopoly contracts (Harstad and Crew, 1999; Engel et al. 2001)
and on the renegotiation of concessions (Guasch et al. 2006). Second, because BOT
concession contracts involve a special relationship between public and private entities, a
discussion of BOT concession contracts also belongs to a more generic discussion regard-
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ing public-private partnerships and private nance initiatives. This literature generally
discusses issues of moral hazard in project nancing and rmsoperations (Vaillancourt
Rosenau, 2000; Dewatripont and Legros 2005; Engel et al. 2007), production complemen-
tarity (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Iossa and Martimort 2008), and political economics
(Maskin and Tirole, 2008). Finally, this paper is related to the more general literature
about privatization, which discusses soft budget constraint issues in public institutions
and the e¤ects of market discipline on the management of private rms (Kornai, 1980;
Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; etc.). To clarify our argument, we do not discuss such
issues in the present paper. Rather, instead, we focus on the trade-o¤ between govern-
mentsnancial pressures and allocative ine¢ ciencies in the particular case of concession
contracts with variable terms (see also Auriol and Picard, 2008 and 2009).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 discusses
the choice of a BOT concession contract in the case of symmetric information. Section
4 discusses this choice in the context of asymmetric information. It focuses on two main
cases of ex-ante information structure and studies di¤erent subcases of project character-
istic transferability. Section 5 o¤ers the extensions to the presence of a price cap and to
asymmetries in governmentsand rmsopportunity costs of time. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs are relegated to the appendices.
2 The Model
The government has to decide whether a facility/infrastructure project should be run
publicly or under build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme. In line with La¤ont and
Tirole (1993), the public regime is a regime in which the government makes the project
investment and keeps control and cash-ow rights during the whole project life. As it is
standard in the regulation literature the governments control rights are associated with
accountability on prots and losses. That is, the government subsidizes the regulated rm
in case of losses whereas it taxes it in case of prots. Such a combination of control rights
and accountability duties by public authorities is typical of public ownership.
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In contrast, the BOT regime is a combination of private and public management.
The government grants a concession to a concession holder who invests and keeps control
and cash-ow rights for a well-dened concession period. During this time period, the
government takes no responsibility for the rms prots and losses. The essence of BOT
contracts is that the government does not have to make any cash transfer to the private
investor; the investment is paid by the concession holder who recovers its cost from the
operating prots generated during the concession period.9In what follow we simply assume
that the concession holder is allowed to operate under laissez-faire so that she is able to
get its monopoly prot during the concession. As shown Subsection 5.1 a price cap or
minimum output constraint does not qualitatively alter our analysis.
To avoid introducing a bias in favor or against BOT we assume that userspreferences
and available technologies are the same under public management and BOT concession.
We consider a continuous time model where the government, concession holders and public
rms managers have the same opportunity cost of time . To simplify the exposition we
assume that the demand and cost parameters remain constant for the whole life of the
project once the investment is made.10 In every time period t, the users of the project
get an instantaneous gross surplus S(Qt) where Qt is the quantity of consumed goods
or services and where S 0(Qt) > 0 > S 00(Qt). We assume that users cannot store and
transfer those goods or services to the next time periods. So, the whole production must
be consumed within the same time period and must be sold at the market equilibrium
price P (Qt)  S 0(Qt), which denes the inverse demand function.
The rm faces increasing returns to scale technology. After sinking an irreversible
9There exists a conict of interest between governments and concession holders about risk bearing.
In the E.U. context, governments are required to make the concession holders bear the operation and/or
demand risks. This is the view adopted in this paper. For instance, the huge losses of Channel Tunnel
project were borne by shareholders only. No subsidy was o¤ered. Only an extension of the concession
period was granted. By contrast, Guasch et al. (2008) illustrate that Latin American concession contracts
are renegotiated by rms to shift ex-post the risk on users/taxpayers. These renegotiations severely
undermine the benet of concessions.
10The model can readily be interpreted to the case where the cost/demand parameter varies through
time for t > 0 and is repeatedly drawn from the same cost/demand distribution.
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investment cost K > 0 at the initial time period t = 0, the rm begins to produce its
good or service at a constant marginal cost during each subsequent time period t > 0. We
assume that the investment cost K is veriable. In our exposition, the uncertainty lies on
the impact of the investment on the technology. That is, the marginal cost parameter 
is idiosyncratic and independently drawn from the support [; ] according to the density
and cumulative distribution functions g() and G(). The expectation operator is denoted
E so that E [h()] =
R 

h()dG(). For example,  captures the cost uncertainty inherent
to the operation and maintenance of a road concession with variable tra¢ c or to the
hauling and handling of containers in a harbor. A larger variance corresponds to a more
risky project. It is important to note that our discussion also relates to information
asymmetry about demand as  can also be interpreted as a demand parameter. In
our model, cost and demand information asymmetries are indeed isomorphic as one can
normalize marginal cost to zero and dene the demand as P (Q)    and the surplus as
S(Q)  Q where  2 [; ] now denes a "demand shifter" (i.e., a higher  corresponds
to a lower demand). All subsequent analysis and computations remain valid.
To avoid corner solutions in the sequel, we assume that the good or service generates
a large enough surplus so that shutting down production is never optimal once the xed
cost has been sunk. This means that the willingness to pay for the rst unit of the good
or service must be su¢ ciently large to allow concession holders and public rms make a
positive margin:
A1 P (0) >  +G()=g()
As the rm never makes an operating loss after its investment, a rm is never in the
position to renegociate its contract.
As in La¤ont and Tirole (1993), the government is assumed to be benevolent and
utilitarian. It maximizes the sum of consumers and producers surpluses minus the social
cost of transferring public funds to the rm. The governments intertemporal objective
function is given by
W   K   T0 +
Z 1
0
[S(Qt)  Qt   Tt] e tdt
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This objective includes the initial investment cost K and a transfer T0 at t = 0 and
the discounted value of subsequent net surplus S(Qt) Qt and social cost of government
transfers Tt for all t > 0. The social cost of transfers includes either taxes paid by the
rm (Tt < 0) or subsidies granted to the rm (Tt > 0), which are valued at the shadow
cost of public funds . The government maximizes the net consumer surplus when the
shadow cost of public funds  is close to zero whereas it puts more weight on the social
cost of transfers when this shadow cost becomes larger. When the latter becomes very
large ( ! 1), the government is mainly interested in the impact of transfers on its
budget: it taxes the rm in the event of prots and avoids any subsidy in the event of
losses.
The shadow cost of public funds , which measures the social cost of the governments
economic intervention, drives the results of the paper. In a setting in which governments
implement many projects and have many funding sources, the shadow cost can be in-
terpreted as the Lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint. The shadow
cost of public funds is positive because transfers to rms imply either a decrease in the
production of public goods, such as schooling and health care, or an increase in distor-
tionary taxation. Each euro that is transferred to the regulated rm costs 1 +  euros to
society. In developed economies,  is mainly equal to the deadweight loss accrued to im-
perfect income taxation. It is assessed to be around 0:3 (Snower and Warren, 1996).11 In
developing countries, low income levels and di¢ culties in implementing e¤ective taxation
programs are strong constraints on the governments budget, which leads to higher values
of . The World Bank (1998) suggests a shadow cost of 0:9. It is presumably higher
in countries close to nancial bankruptcy. For simplicity, we assume that governments
funding conditions remains the same for the whole time period so that the shadow cost
11The shadow cost of public funds  reects the macro-economic constraints that are imposed on
national governments surpluses and debts levels by supranational institutions (e.g. in the Maastricht
treaty on E.U. member states, in the I.M.F. on many developing countries). It also reects micro-economic
constraints of government agencies that are unable to commit to long-term investment expenditures in
their annual or pluri-annual budgets. In the context of PPP, the shadow cost of public funds reects the
short term opportunity gain to record infrastructure assets out of the governments book.
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of public funds is constant through time.
Under public management, denoted by the superscript p, the rm is run by the public
rms manager.12 She receives subsidies from the government, or pays cash transfers to
it, according to the nancial viability of her project. Her instantaneous utility is equal to
Ut =
8<:  K + T0 if t = 0P (Qt)Qt   Qt + Tt if t > 0
where T0 is an up-front transfer to the rm, and Tt is a transfer at time t. We assume that
the public rms manager has an outside option, which value is normalized to zero, so that
her utility is always positive: Ut  0.13 The governments cash-ow rights over the public
rm hence come with the requirement that the rm breaks even at any point in time.
The transfers cover the public rm instantaneous prots and losses so that T0 = K for
t = 0 and Tt = Ut   [P (Qt)Qt   Qt] for t > 0. Therefore, the governments objective
function is given by
Wp    (1 + )K + E
Z 1
0
[S(Qt) + P (Qt)Qt   (1 + ) Qt   Ut] e tdt
Under BOT concession contracts, denoted by the superscript b, the risk neutral con-
cession holder receives no transfer, and the government does not pay or get any transfer
until the end of the concession period. In particular we assume that the parties do not
renegociate. Therefore, Tt = 0 for any t  t1, where t1 is the concession period. At the
end of the concession period, the control and cashow rights of infrastructure shift to the
government.14The concession holders instantaneous utility is:
bt =
8>><>>:
 K if t = 0
P (Qt)Qt   Qt if 0 < t  t1
0 if t > t1
12The concept of public manager can be extended to any constituency within the rm that seeks to
extract rents from the rmsactivity.
13Allowing a positive outside option for the public manager (like an outside salary) would reduce the
attractiveness of regulation compared to BOT and reinforce our results.
14This is for instance the preferred option of UK government for Public Finance Initiatives (PFI).
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The concession holder gets a net present value equal to
b =  K + E
Z t1
0
[P (Qt)Qt   Qt] e tdt:
Under BOT, the governments objective function writes as
Wb   K + E
Z t1
0
[S(Qt)  Qt] e tdt
+ E
Z 1
t1
[S(Qt) + P (Qt)Qt   (1 + ) Qt   Ut] e tdt
To guarantee the concavity of prots and governments objective we assume that the
demand function is not too convex:
A2 P 00(Q)Q+ P 0(Q) < 0.
Under BOT, the concession holder controls the rm during the concession period (0; t1)
but relinquishes her control at the termination time of the concession, t1. Therefore, the
instantaneous output and surplus remain constant during the concession period and after
it. We denote each of those two time periods by the subscript 1 and 2 so that output
is denoted as Q1 during (0; t1) and Q2 during [t1;1). Let us dene the "concession
duration" L as L= =
R t1
0
e tdt. We have
R1
t1
e tdt = (1  L) =. Since the net present
value of a dollar is equal to
R1
0
e tdt = 1=, the concession duration L corresponds to
the net present value of a permanent income of one dollar during the BOT concession and
1   L corresponds the net present value of this permanent income after the concession
period. Finally it is convenient to use the following denition of the instantaneous welfare
of government:
W (Q; )  S(Q) + P (Q)Q  (1 + ) Q (1)
which is concave under assumption A2.
Using those denitions, we can re-write the governments objectives more compactly
as
Wp =   (1 + ) K + E [W (Q; )  U ] (2)
Wb =  K + L E [S(Q1)  Q1] + (1  L)E [W (Q2; )  U ] (3)
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and
b =  K + L E [P (Q1)Q1   Q1] (4)
3 Symmetric Information
Under symmetric information, both government and concession holder have perfect infor-
mation about the cost parameter  during the project life. This means that the expec-
tation operator can be removed in the expressions (2) to (4) (i.e. E [h()] = h()). We
denote the values of the variables under symmetric information by the superscript .
We rst study the case of public management. The government has no incentives to
raise the utility of the public rms manager (or her organization) above her reservation
value. In this informational context, it is able to set the transfers so that the public
rms manager gets no rent: U = 0. The government proposes a production level Q that
maximizes
Wp =   (1 + ) K +W (Q; )
The rst order condition is equal to
@
@Q
W (Q; ) = 0 () P (Q) + 
1 + 
P 0(Q)Q = : (5)
which yields the optimal output Q.
We now study the case of a BOT concession. The governments objective is then given
by
Wb =  K + L [S(Q1)  Q1] + (1  L) W (Q2; )
During the concession period, the concession holder makes the prot
b =  K + L [P (Q1)Q1   Q1]
Because she is allowed to run the rm under laissez-faire during the concession period,
she chooses the monopoly output Q1 = Qm, which maximizes the above expression. The
monopoly solution is given by the following rst order condition:
@b
@Q
= 0 () P (Qm) + P 0(Qm)Qm =  (6)
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Comparing expressions (5) and (6), it is obvious that Q > Qm for  > 0 and Q = Qm
for  ! 1. This output level converges towards the monopoly level when the shadow
cost of public funds becomes very large. In this case, the government aims to tap the
maximal prot from the rm.
At the concession term, the government maximizes the objective function W (Q2; )
which is equal to the function Wp plus some constant. As a result, the optimal output
is given by (5): Q2 = Q. Finally, the government needs to set a concession contract.
Because the government has no incentive to leave rents to the concession holder, it sets
the concession termination time to t1 so as to make the concession holder just breaks
even: b = 0. Because t1 is monotonically related to the concession duration L, this
means that
L =
K
P (Qm)Qm   Qm (7)
The concession is longer for larger investment costs and smaller operational prots, an
intuitive result.
We are now equipped to compare public management and BOT concession under full
information. The government prefers public management over the BOT concession if and
only if Wp  Wb; using the denition (1), this condition is equivalent to
L fW (Q; )  [S(Qm)  Qm]g  K (8)
This inequality reects the governments cost and benet of a public management under
symmetric information. On the one hand, the government must fund the investment K
at the value of the shadow costs of public funds. On the other hand, it benets from a
higher welfare during the concession period. Note that the concession holder sets her bid
on concession duration L in proportion to her investment cost K. Therefore, a rise in
this cost augments proportionally both members of the above inequality. Any additional
investment cost raises proportionally both the public funding cost of the project and the
welfare advantage of public management. The investment cost has thus no impact on the
governments decision to use public management and BOT concessions.15 This property
15We are grateful to Y. Spiegel for this remark.
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will remain true under asymmetric information provided that cost characteristics cannot
be transferred. Using (1) and (7), the inequality (8) becomes
W (Q; )  W (Qm; )
which is always satised because W is concave and reaches its maximum at Q = Q() 
Qm() for all  2 [; ]. The BOT concession is at best equivalent to public management.
This result remains true for any shadow cost of public funds. Indeed, whereas the conces-
sion holder is concerned only by her producer surplus, the government also considers the
consumer surplus and the cost of public funding. The concession holder therefore chooses
an output level that is always too high from the governments viewpoint. We collect this
result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under symmetric information, a BOT concession never yields a higher
welfare than public management.
Proposition 1 is a reminiscence of the standard result in regulation theory stating that
a benevolent and fully informed government cannot perform worse than the market since
it can at least replicate the market outcome. As in Auriol and Picard (2008) this result
applies for any shadow cost of public funds. The fact that the government limits the
laissez-faire period by restraining the concession period does not a¤ect this result.
Note nally that Proposition 1 contrasts with Engel et al.s (2007) result of "irrelevance
of the cost of public funds". As in this section, those authors analyze the public nance
of public-private-partnerships under the perfect information. However, those authors as-
sume away any allocative ine¢ ciencies in the sense that price and output conditions, and
therefore consumer surplus and revenues, remain exactly the same under public and pri-
vate management. Put di¤erently, they impose in our setting that Q = Qm and therefore
W (Q; ) = W (Qm; ), which makes the cost of public funds irrelevant in the BOT con-
cession decision. However, once price and output conditions di¤er during the periods of
concession and public management, the government can no longer be indi¤erent between
two forms of management. It negatively discounts the possible allocative ine¢ ciencies
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under BOT concession contracts and thus favors public management. As will be seen
below, such a result is qualied by the existence of asymmetric information.
4 Asymmetric Information
As it is standard in the regulation literature, we take the view that the government
faces di¢ culties in acquiring information about rms cost and must rely on a public
rms manager to obtain this information. In contrast, concession holders face a much
weaker information asymmetry with their own managers because they have expertise
about facility projects and because they can provide better incentives. In particular,
concession holders can tailor their managersrewards to the concession prot levels while
such an option is rarely applicable in publicly managed rms. As a consequence, the
public management tends to inate their costs to benet from rents. Empirical evidences
support this view that public rms are on average less productive and less protable than
their private counterparts (Megginson and Netter 2001).
The paper distinguishes two issues that naturally arise in the discussion of BOT con-
cessions. The rst issue, which is used to structure the paper, concerns the information
asymmetry between public authorities and concession holders at the time of the con-
cession contract signature and investment. Concession holders may indeed have better
information about the project characteristics before the moment they sign and invest
(ex-ante asymmetry) or after that moment (ex-ante symmetry). An ex-ante information
asymmetry reects governments information disadvantage, generally due to some lack
of expertise and experience. Ex-ante information symmetry reects a genuine project
uncertainty. In this paper, the information asymmetry relates to the cost characteristic
, but it can be interpreted as an information asymmetry about demand (i.e.,  can be a
demand shifter). As noted above, cost and demand characteristics are two isomorphisms
of the same model.
The second issue concerns the characteristics of the asset that is transferred to the
public authorities at the end of the concession period. Project characteristics cannot be
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transferred if they are related to concession holders management skills, business practices
or synergies with other projects. Concession holders can indeed have technical expertise
and experience that are not transferable. Information on their costs will not help the
government to evaluate the public managements cost reports after the concession period.
By contrast, project characteristics can be transferred if they are inherent to the physical
nature of the facility. For instance, the tra¢ c on a highway is likely to remain the
same after the concession has ended. If the initial uncertainty lies on the volume of the
demand, when the government inherits the project at the end of the concession period,
it also inherits its demand characteristics, which in our setting simply means that it also
learns .
Before turning to the analysis of these di¤erent cases, we rst study the case of public
management.
4.1 Public Management
Under asymmetric information, the government proposes a production and transfer scheme
(Q(; t); T (; t)) that entices the public rms manager with cost  to reveal its private
information through time t. Baron and Besanko (1984) have shown that the re-use of in-
formation by the principal generates a ratchet e¤ect that is sub-optimal for the principal.
Even though the cost remains constant over time, the principal is better o¤by committing
to the repetition of the static contract and recurrently paying the information rent em-
bedded in the static contract. Hence, in our context, the production and transfer scheme
simplify to the time-independent scheme (Q(); T ()).16 As a result, we can readily use
expression (2) where outputs and transfers were set to be time independent.
By the revelation principle, the analysis can be restricted to direct truthful revelation
mechanism where the concession holder reports its true cost . To avoid the technicalities
of bunching, we make the classical monotone hazard rate assumptions:
16If the principal cannot credibly commit, the ratchet e¤ect will lower the benet of public management.
This will reinforce our results showing that, even with the assumptions of perfect commitment and
benevolence, public management is not always optimal.
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A3 G()=g() is non decreasing.
Under asymmetric information the government maximizes the objective function:
max
fQ();U()g
Wp =   (1 + ) K + E [W (Q(); )  U()] (9)
subject to
dU()
d
=  Q () (10)
dQ()
d
 0 (11)
U()  0 (12)
Conditions (10) and (11) are the rst and second order incentive compatibility constraints
that entice the rm to reveal its private information  truthfully. Condition (12) is the
public rms managers participation constraint. This problem is a standard adverse
selection problem of regulation under asymmetric information (see Baron and Myerson
1982, La¤ont and Tirole 1993). The public rms manager with the highest cost  = 
gets zero utility. Equation (10) implies that U() =
R 

Q(x)dx. Using integration by
part in the objective function yields E [U()] = E [Q()G()=g()]. Substituting this
value in the objective function and di¤erentiating pointwise gives the following rst order
condition which characterizes the optimal output Qp:
P (Q) +

1 + 
P 0(Q)Q =  +

1 + 
G()
g()
: (13)
Assumptions A1 to A3 guarantees that the second order condition is satised. Moreover
under assumption A2 the output Qp is non increasing in  so that condition (11) is
satised. Comparing equation (5) with equation (13), one can check that the output level
under asymmetric information is obtained by replacing the marginal cost  by the virtual
cost  + (=(1 + ))G()=g() that is obviously larger than . Because the LHS of (13)
decreases in Q, we deduce that the output level under asymmetric information is lower
than under symmetric information. In order to reduce the rms incentive to inate its
cost report, the government requires high cost rms to produce less than it would do under
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symmetric information. The distortion increases with . For high shadow costs of public
funds, the output can hence be lower than the monopoly laissez-faire level. For instance
when !1, one gets that =(1+)! 1 so that Qp()! Qm(+G()=g()) < Qm()
8 2 (; ].
Substituting Qp in Wp, at the optimum the governments objective is equal to
Wp =   (1 + ) K + E

W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp

(14)
This expression shows the two negative e¤ects of information asymmetry on the govern-
ments objective. First, it introduces, through the term   (G()=g())Qp, a rent to the
public rms manager (or her organization), which reduces total welfare. Second, it forces
the government to distort output downwards so that Qp()  Q().
We now discuss BOT concession contracts under two main settings. In Subsection
4.2 we focus on concessions where there is a large uncertainty about the protability
of the project at the time of concession contract signature. In Subsection 4.3 we study
concessions where the private sector has a technical advantage over the public to produce
a commodity or service.
4.2 Ex-Ante Information Symmetry
In this subsection, we assume that the government has the same information as the
concession holder at the time when she signs the concession contract and makes her
investment. Yet the concession holder and the public rms manager acquire private
information about the cost parameter  once the investment K is sunk. The public
management has hence the same informational context of Section 4.1 so that optimal
contracts and expected welfare are simply given by expressions (13) and (14).
By contrast, under BOT concessions, the governments objective is given by (3). Before
the concession contract, the concession holder does not know her cost parameter and
gets the expected prot (4). During the concession period, the concession holder obtains
information about her cost parameter just after sinking her investment and sets her output
that maximizes her contemporaneous operational prot P (Q1)Q1   Q1. This yields the
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monopoly output Q1 = Qm() given by expression (6). Solving the problem backward
the government computes the optimal concession duration. Because it has no incentive
to leave rents to the concession holder, the government chooses the concession duration
Ls so as to allow the concession holder to break even ex-ante (i.e., b = 0):
Ls =
K
E [P (Qm)Qm   Qm] ; (15)
where the superscript s refers to the situation of ex-ante information symmetry. The
concession period is longer for larger investment cost and smaller expected operational
prots, which is fairly intuitive.
We can now study the conditions under which a BOT concession is better than public
management in the cases where the project characteristics are transferable to the public
sector and where they are not.
4.2.1 Non Transferability
We begin with the benchmark case where cost characteristics are specic to the concession
holder and cannot be transferred to the public authorities at the end of the concession
period. In this case we show that the governments choice for a BOT concession depends
on the shadow cost of public funds. This benchmark case will be used as a basis of
comparison in the next subsections.
In this benchmark case, the government does not know the value of  at the end of
the concession period. When it takes over the facility, the government therefore faces the
same information asymmetry as in the case of public management discussed in Subsection
4.1. More formally, the government sets the output level Q2 that maximizes the after-
concession objective function (1  Ls)E [W (Q2; )  U ] subject to the same incentive
and participation constraints as in expressions (10) to (12). Because Ls is independent of
Q2, the output level Q2 is the same solution as in the program (9). That is, Q2 = Qp()
as dened in equation (13). The expected value of governments objective under BOT is
given by:
Wb =  K + Ls E [S(Qm)  Qm] + (1  Ls)E

W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp

: (16)
21
We can thus compare public management and BOT concession contract. The government
prefers public management over the BOT concession if and only if Wp > Wb. Plugging
equations (14) and (16) this inequality is equivalent to
Wp  Wb =  K + L
s


E[W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp]  E [S(Qm)  Qm]

> 0: (17)
The government trades o¤the social cost of nancing the investment (i.e. the rst negative
term) with the social benet of avoiding laissez-faire during the concession period (i.e.
the second term in curly bracket). Substituting the optimal concession period Ls dened
in (15), condition (17) then simplies to
E
h
W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp
i
> E [W (Qm; )] : (18)
The government prefers public management to a BOT concession contract for small
enough shadow costs of public funds. Indeed, for ! 0, the output level Qp is equal to the
one obtained under symmetric information, Qp = Q, which is always larger than the level
under laissez-faire. Hence, condition (18) becomes E [W (Q; )] > E [W (Qm; )] which is
true sinceW (Q; ) > W (Qm; ) for any  2 [; ]. This is a reminiscence of Proposition
1. When subsidies to publicly managed projects involve no social costs, the government
is willing to take the control and cash-ow rights at the expense of the information rents
because the latter imply only redistributive e¤ects. The following proposition shows that
this conclusion is reversed for su¢ ciently high shadow costs of public funds.
Proposition 2 Suppose that BOT concession contracts are signed under symmetric in-
formation and that the cost characteristics are not transferable at the end of the concession
period. Then, there exists a unique snt > 0 such that a BOT concession yields a higher
welfare than public management if and only if   snt.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In this proposition the superscript snt refers to the present conguration with ex-
ante information symmetry and non transferability of project characteristics. The above
proposition is illustrated by Figure 1. It displays the value of the governments objective
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with respect to the shadow cost of public funds under public management and BOT
concession contracts. In this gure the value of government objective increases under
both settings. Indeed, as  rises, the government put more weight on the investment cost
as well as on the subsidies to the publicly managed rm. On the one hand, under the
BOT concession, the investment cost is transferred to the concession holder and is not
associated with the governments cost of raising public funds. On the other hand, under
public management, managers tend to inate their cost so that the government responds
by lowering output levels. These e¤ects are stronger when  increases, explaining the
result of Proposition 2.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
It is nally important to note that the present analysis based on a non transferable
cost  extends to the case where this parameter randomly uctuates during the project
life. This will for example be the case when  represents a uctuating maintenance cost.
More precisely, when  is repeatedly drawn from the same time-independent distribution
G() over the support [; ], the government is unable to infer any relevant information
from past outcomes and is constrained to o¤er the same contract to the public rm in any
point of time. As shown by Baron and Besanko (1982), incentive contracts have the same
structure when the parameter associated with asymmetric information is repeatedly and
independently drawn or when it is drawn once at the beginning of a time period from a
same probability distribution. Since a stochastic cost parameter  cannot be transferred
from the concession holder to the public manager, it is therefore compatible only with
the case where such costs are not transferable, as in this subsection and in the next
Subsections 4.3 and 4.4.
4.2.2 Transferability
We turn now to the case where the cost characteristics are transferred to the public author-
ities at the end of the concession period. This setting ts particularly well the analysis of
concession contracts where uncertainty lies on demand. Indeed many concession projects
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involve the same demand uncertainty for both governments and concession holders. De-
mand conditions are revealed after the construction and exploitation of the facility and are
readily transferred to the public authorities at the end of the concession period. However,
for the sake of consistency, we keep our discussion with cost uncertainty. In the case of
transferability the cost parameter  is related to the physical investment, or the intrinsic
nature of the project, rather than to the specic management by the concession holder.
At the end of the concession period the government inherits from the information on
the project characteristics of the concession. The government is no longer harmed by
information asymmetries and uncertainties. Knowing the true , it can set the optimal
output Q2 = Q() (instead of Q2 = Qp() previously). A substantial benet of the BOT
concession is hence to able the government to exploit the information revealed during the
concession time without the fear of the ratchet e¤ect. This is an important additional
benet of the BOT concession. So, the expected value of governments objective under
the BOT concession is now given by
Wb =  K + Lsym E [S(Qm)  Qm] + (1  Lsym)E [W (Q; )]
and must be compared to the corresponding value under public management (14). The
government prefers public management over the BOT concession if and only ifWp >Wb.
After some algebraic manipulation, this is equivalent to
E
h
W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp
i
> E [W (Qm; )] (19)
+
1  Lsym
Lsym

E

W (Q; )
  EhW (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp
i
The impact of cost transferability on the choice of a BOT concession is readily un-
derstood by comparing the latter inequality with the benchmark inequality (18). Indeed,
because W (Q; ) > W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp, a BOT concession is always more valuable for
the government with cost transferability than without it. The government can indeed
avoid the information cost of the publicly managed rm at the end of the concession pe-
riod. The value of this option increases as the concession duration Lsym gets smaller and
as the welfare discrepancy between the rst-best and second best in public management
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rises (i.e., the curly bracket in inequality (18) rises). BOT concessions are also likely to
be preferred when cost uncertainty and therefore information costs become larger. More
risky projects are then more likely to be given BOT concession contracts.
Proposition 3 Suppose that BOT concession contracts are signed under symmetric in-
formation and that cost characteristics are transferred at the end of the concession period.
Then, there exists st > 0 such that a BOT concession yields a higher welfare than public
management if and only if  > st. Moreover 0 < st < snt.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In this proposition the superscript st refers to the present conguration with ex-ante
information symmetry and transferability of project characteristics. In contrast to the
previous conguration, the transferability of cost characteristics makes the choice for
a BOT concession dependent on investment costs K. In particular, BOT concessions
are more often preferred for smaller investment costs. Indeed, smaller investment costs
shorten the concession durations Lst and increases the RHS of condition (19), making BOT
concession more likely. This occurs because the government benets from the transfer of
cost characteristics and information at the end of the concession. Ceteris paribus, smaller
investments result in shorter concessions, faster information revelation and shorter periods
of allocation ine¢ ciencies.
4.3 Ex-ante Information Asymmetry
In this subsection we assume that concession holders have private information about
their marginal costs at the time they sign their concession contracts. For the sake of
comparison and conciseness, we concentrate on the case where cost characteristics are
not transferable at the end of the concession period. This realistically corresponds to
the situation where the government has no specialized knowledge about the provision of
the service or infrastructure and faces concession candidates who are specialized in that
business (e.g., multinational rms specialized in waste management or water sanitization).
In this conguration, each concession candidate acquires her private information before
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sinking her investment so that information asymmetry exists at any time including the
contract signature date t = 0. In contrast to the previous setting in 4.2, the government
can reduce its initial informational disadvantage if there exists more than one concession
candidate. In this case, concession candidates are likely to di¤er in their cost possibilities
or assessments. The government can take advantage of the heterogeneity of candidates
by organizing an auction. We assume here that the object of the auction is the concession
period.17
The set-up of public management is the same as in the previous subsection. The BOT
concession is also quite similar. Indeed, during the BOT concession period, the concession
holder is perfectly informed about her cost parameter. She runs her rm under laissez-
faire and thus sets the monopoly output Q1 = Qm(). At the end of the concession period,
the cost information is not transferred to the government so that the latter has the same
informational problem as under public management. The optimal output is equal to
Q2 = Q
p(). The main di¤erence between this set-up and the previous one lies in the way
the BOT contract is attributed. Here the concession holder is the winner of an auction
that determines the concession period and the ex-post cost probability distribution.
By virtue of the revenue equivalence theorem, we focus without any loss of generality
on a second bid auction over the BOT concession period with N  1 bidders. Each bidder
i 2 f1; :::; Ng has a cost parameter i independently drawn from the distribution G. The
bidder with the shortest concession termination time ti wins the concession and is allowed
to operate during the second shortest term tj = mink 6=i tk. Because second bid auctions
induce truthful revelation, each bidder i bids according to her own true cost parameter
i. The bid of concession candidate i is therefore the shortest possible concession period
for a monopoly with cost i. It is given by the following concession duration:
Li =
K
P (Qmi )Q
m
i   iQmi
(20)
where Qmi  Qm(i) is the monopoly output of a concession holder with cost i.
17Note that an auction over a franchise fee does not yield the same results. In this case, the government
must set the concession termination time and faces no uncertainty about the duration of allocative
ine¢ ciencies (see subsection 4.4).
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For the sake of conciseness, we rank the concession candidates according to their cost
parameters so that 1  2  :::  N . So, the winner of the auction is the concession
candidate i = 1 who is granted a concession of duration L2. This concession holder will set
the monopoly output Qm1 = Q
m(1). Under BOT, the value of the governments objective
then becomes equal to
Wb =  K + E12 [L2 (S(Qm1 )  1Qm1 )] + E2 [1  L2]E

W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp

where E2 [] denotes the expectation that the second highest bidder has a cost 2 and where
E12 [] denotes the expectation that the rst and second highest bidders respectively have
the costs 1 and 2 (see a full denition of those expectation operators in the Appendix).
The governments objective includes the cost of the facility, the expected net present value
of welfare during the concession and the expected net present value of public management
after the concession termination time. Using (14) we can compare public management to
BOT concessions. Public management is strictly preferred to BOT if and only if
 K  E12 [L2 (S(Qm1 )  1Qm1 )] + E2 [L2]E

W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp

> 0:
Contrary to the previous cases it is not straightforward to compare the two regimes.
We introduce new notations to ease the computations. Let W0 denote the expected
welfare di¤erence between public management and BOT concession when  = 0. Using
Q0  lim!0Q, one can write
W0  E2 [L2]E [S(Q0)  Q0]  E12

L2
 
S(Qm1)  1Qm1

Let
v() =  +
G()
g()
(21)
be the virtual cost of production of the publicly managed rm under asymmetric infor-
mation when ! +1, and let
m() = [P (Qm())  ]Qm() (22)
be the concession holders operational prot during the concession period. In order to get
the next result it is su¢ cient to add the following assumption.
27
C1 E [m (v())]E2 [1=m (2)] < 1.
A su¢ cient condition for C1 to hold is E [v()]  . This condition is for instance satised
by uniform cost distributions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that BOT concession contracts are signed under asymmetric in-
formation and that cost characteristics are not transferable at the end of the concession
period. Suppose further that BOT contracts are awarded through an auction on concession
period. Then, under condition C1, there exists a unique ant > 0 so that BOT concessions
yields a higher welfare than public management if and only if W0  0 or   ant.
Proof. See Appendix C
In this proposition the superscript snt refers to the present conguration with ex-ante
information symmetry and non transferability of project characteristics. The condition
W0 > 0 determines that the government prefers public management for small shadow
costs of public funds and BOT concession contracts otherwise. Note that the condition
depends on cost uncertainty. Indeed, if  =  =  so that there is no risk then we
have that W0 = [S(Q0)  Q0]   [S(Qm)  Qm] > 0. By continuity, the condition
is satised for small enough cost uncertainty. Therefore, if both the ex-ante information
asymmetry and shadow cost of public funds are small enough, the government prefers
public management. More generally, a su¢ cient condition for W0 > 0 is given by
S(Q0())  Q0()
  S(Qm())   Qm() > 0. This condition implies that the net
surplus generated by a public rm under the worst cost realization is larger than the net
surplus generated by a concession holder under the best cost realization. It is equivalent
to the condition that the lowest laissez-faire price P (Qm()) be larger than the highest
marginal cost . By assumption A1, this is true under linear demands and uniform cost
distributions.
By contrast, for negative W0 or large , it is always optimal to organize an auction
for the attribution of the BOT concession. However, if the project protability is low,
a BOT auction can fail to attract a concession candidate. This is a major problem
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in developing countries where budget constrained governments favor BOT projects but
project protability is too weak to attract concession holders.
To see what happens when the number of bidders varies, we now compare the choice for
a BOT concession when the concession holder does and does not have more information
before signing her concession contract. To sterilize the potential e¤ects of characteristics
transferability, we maintain throughout the assumption that cost characteristics cannot
be transferred. Therefore, we compare the benchmark snt dened in Proposition 2 to
ant dened in Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 For N = 1, snt < ant whereas snt > ant for su¢ ciently large N .
Proof. See Appendix D.
If the number of bidders is large enough, the government is able to extract a signicant
share of the concession holders rent through the auction. This makes BOT concessions
very attractive when concession holders are ex-ante informed on the production costs.
However if the auction attracts few bidders, the winner gets a long concession period and
collects a high rent.18 As a result, the government should auction the BOT concession if it
anticipates a large number of bidders; otherwise, it should invest in studies to decrease its
knowledge gap about project costs. Such preliminary studies would help level the playing
eld for concession contract negotiations.
4.4 Bidding on Concession Revenue
To avoid costly renegotiations, Engel et al. (2001) suggest to adopt an auction mechanism,
where the BOT concession is granted to the candidate who bids the least present value
of the concession revenues. With this type of allocation mechanism, the concession ends
only when the concession holder has realized the revenue it has bid for: the franchise
term endogenously adjusts to possible shock realizations. However, to be implemented
such a mechanism requires that the concession holders revenue be observable and non
18In fact, this argument is not particular to BOT project. It also applies to procurement procedures
where it is preferable to organize auctions with the largest number of bidders.
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manipulable. This assumption may be far-fetched in some infrastructure projects, but
be realistic for others. In this section we thus aim to compare the least-present-value-of-
revenue auction with the foregoing concession contracts.
Note at the outset that both the auctions on concession period or revenue yield the
same outcome when concession holders have private and certain information before sub-
mitting their bids and when the government is able to organize a competitive auction.
Because of the competitive pressure, the government is indeed able to select the most
e¢ cient concession candidate and to reduce her rent to zero. The two auctions select the
same candidate so that the bidden revenue exactly corresponds to the rms proceeds for
the bidden concession period. By contrast, the auctions yield di¤erent outcomes when
the government and concession holder have no information on future cost realization at
the time of the contract signature. The commercial risk faced by the concession holder
is higher with the auction on concession period than with the one on revenue. In this
section, we explore the revenue auction and compare it to the BOT concession contract
discussed in Subsection 4.2.1. So, in both situations, cost information is symmetric ex-
ante and cost characteristics are not transferable. For the sake of consistency, we assume
that the private entrepreneur is free to set the monopoly price.
Revenue auction requires the concession candidates to bid the net present value of
revenues that they will be allowed to earn from the facility. In practice, the concession
candidates report their revenue ows and the government chooses the candidate reporting
the smallest discounted value of those ows using a specic interest rate.19 For the sake
of simplicity, let this interest rate be equal to the governments and concession holders
opportunity cost of time . Let then R be the net present value of revenue that is reported
in the winning bid. During the concession period, the concession holder sets her monopoly
output Qm() that depends on her cost realization  but remains constant through time.
The revenue bid R determines the concession termination time t1(;R) such that, ex-post,
R =
R t1
0
P (Qm())Qm()e tdt. The concession termination time t1(;R), which solves
19Public transparency would call for a non-discounted sum of revenues. In the present model, revenues
are constant. So, there is a one-to-one mapping between the discounted and the non-discounted sum of
revenues.
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this equality, increases with larger R and higher . Let the (cost contingent) concession
duration be L1(;R)= =
R t1(;R)
0
e td = R=[P (Qm())Qm()]. In a competitive auc-
tion, the concession holder bids R so that its expected prot is nil. That is, the bid R
should be equal to the expected revenue (1=)E [L1(;R)P (Qm())Qm()] and at the
same time to the expected cost K + (1=)E [L1(;R)Qm()]. The latter relationship
implies that R = K +RE f=P [Qm()]g, which gives R = K= [1  E f=P [Qm()]g].
The welfare under BOT concession is then given by
Wb =  K + E fL1(;R) [S(Qm())  Qm()]g
+ E

(1  L1(;R))

W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp

which must be compared to the welfare under public management (14). Public manage-
ment is preferred i¤ Wp > Wb, or equivalently, i¤
E

L1(;R)

W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp  W (Qm; )

> 0: (23)
It can be shown that the square bracket in this expression is positive for  ! 0 and
negative for !1.
Proposition 6 Suppose that government and concession holder have the same informa-
tion before the concession contract and that cost characteristics are not transferable at the
end of the concession period. If the concession is granted on the basis of the least present
value of revenue, then, there exists a unique rev > 0 such that a BOT concession yields
a higher welfare than public management if and only if   rev.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Intuitively, when shadow costs of public funds are small or nil, the information rents
yields only a wealth redistribution between taxpayers and public managers: those rents
have no social cost. The government is then better o¤ by allocating itself the rms
production rather than by letting a concession holder restrain its output to the monopoly
level during the concession period. By contrast, when the shadow costs of public funds
are su¢ ciently large, the government wants to tap the maximal prot from the public
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rm. Under full information, it would actually set the same monopoly price and output
as would the concession holder. Under asymmetric information the government must give
incentives to the public manager by distorting price and output levels. These information
rents and the associated distortions limit the governments ability to tap prot from the
project. As a result, the government has higher incentives to grant the project to the
concession holder in compensation for the latters investment.
Note that the choice for the BOT concession with a revenue auction does not depend
on the investment cost and that it is thus more likely to be chosen than the concession
with xed termination time that we discussed in Section 4.2. Indeed, on the one hand,
the state of condition (23) is independent of K because the concession duration L1 is
multiplicative of K. On the other hand, condition (23) is more stringent than condition
(18). This is because the welfare di¤erence W (Qp; )    [G()=g()]Qp   W (Qm; )
decreases with both larger  and  and because L1 increase with . As a result, the
threshold rev is smaller than snt. The main di¤erence between the auctions based on
a xed concession period and on least present value of revenue lies in the risk borne
by the concession holder. Although in both types of concession, rms bear the risk of
cost variability (they break even only in expectation), the least-present-value-of-revenue
auction gives concession holders more exibility about the end of the concession because of
the guarantee of a xed amount of revenues. The drawback of such a concession contract
is that governments still need to monitor of rmsrevenues to enforce their contracts, and
that the contract does not eliminate the risk of renegotiation as the concession holder still
bear a risk (i.e., they dont know their cost when they bid on the revenue target).
4.5 Linear demands and uniform cost distributions
Proposition 2, 3, and 4 state that BOT concessions are preferred to public management
when the shadow cost of public funds is larger than the thresholds snt; ant or st. The
practical relevance of this result depends on the value of these theoretical thresholds. If
the latter are larger than the empirical values for shadow costs of public funds, BOT
concessions will never be optimal. To assess the magnitude of those thresholds we focus
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on the classes of linear demand functions and the uniform distribution of cost .20 Ap-
propriate normalization of output and price units allow us to focus on the inverse demand
function P (Q) = 1   Q and on the interval [0; ] where we can set  = 0 without loss
of generality. This implies that the consumer surplus is equal to S (Q) = Q (1 Q=2) ;
the cost probability distribution to G() = =, and the hazard rate to G()=g() = .
Assumption A1 simplies to   1=2 while assumptions A2 and A3 always hold under
linear demands. Under this setting, one can explicitly compute the theoretical values of
shadow costs of public funds above which BOT concessions are preferred (see Appendix
F).
Table 1 presents the theoretical values for the thresholds when the highest cost para-
meter  varies in an interval between 0:05 and 0:5. A larger  implies a higher ex-ante
uncertainty as well as stronger ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry. To x ideas,
one computes that the ex-post output of a monopoly concession uctuates with a stan-
dard deviation that increases from 1:4% to 19:2% of the expected output when  rises
from 0:05 to 0:5. Such a cost uncertainty also implies uctuations in operational prof-
its whose standard deviations increase from 2:9% to 28:2% of the expected operational
prot.21 Table 1 also displays theoretical values of shadow costs of public funds for three
levels of investment cost: K = 0:05; 0:10 and 0; 15. To x ideas again, let us suppose
an annual interest rate of 10% and that the opportunity cost of time is simply equal to a
compound opportunity cost of capital of  = ln(1 + 10%) 1 ' 0:095. Applying (15), this
implies that, as  rises from 0:05 to 0:5, the concession term increases from about 3 to
6 years if K = 0:05 and from 5 to 13 years if K = 0:10. If K = 0:15, it increases from
11 to 38 years as  rises from 0:05 to 0:45 whereas, for  = 0:5, the cost uncertainty is
too large for the concession holder to make any non negative net present return from her
investment K.
20The reliability of this approach relies on whether demand and cost distribution can reasonably be
approximated by linear functions, which is an empirical issue. Results nevertheless remains robust for
alternative classes of demand and cost distribution functions (see Auriol and Picard 2009 and 2010).
21One readily computes that, for  2 [0:05; 0; 5], pvar [Qm ()]=E [Qm()] 2 [0:014; 0:192] andp
var [P (Qm)Qm   Qm]=E [P (Qm)Qm   Qm] 2 [0:029; 0; 282].
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snt ant1 
ant
1 
st rev
K - - - 0.05 0.10 0.15
 = 0.05 1.79 1 0.87 0.63 1.03 1.33 1.78
0.1 1.15 1 0.42 0.39 0.65 0.87 1.15
0.15 0.87 1 0.22 0.29 0.50 0.68 0.87
0.2 0.71 1 0.11 0.24 0.42 0.57 0.71
0.25 0.6 1 0.03 0.20 0.36 0.50 0.60
0.3 0.52 1 0 0.18 0.32 0.45 0.51
0.35 0.46 1 0 0.16 0.30 0.41 0.45
0.4 0.41 1 0 0.15 0.28 0.39 0.40
0.45 0.38 1 0 0.14 0.26 0.37 0.36
0.5 0.35 1 0 0.14 0.25   0.33
Table 1: Shadow costs of public funds above which BOT concessions are optimal.
Empirical estimates of shadow costs of public funds take values around 0:3 in O.E.C.D.
countries and values larger than 0:9 in developing countries (see Snower andWarren, 1996;
and World Bank, 1998). Comparing both theoretical and empirical values, we can rstly
conclude that the theoretical thresholds snt, ant1 and 
st are likely to lie below the range
of the shadow costs prevailing in developing economies and about the values prevailing
in developed economies. This means that BOT concession contracts are benecial to
governments in many situations.
Table 1 illustrates our earlier results. BOT concessions are preferred if project char-
acteristics can be transferred at the end of the concession period (st < snt) and if
governments lack ex-ante information but is able to organize fairly competitive auctions
(ant1 < 
snt). BOT concessions are never preferred if the auction is not competitive and
includes only one bidder (ant1 =1). This is because the unique bidder has an incentive
to bid the longest possible concession period as she were the least e¢ cient concession
candidate. A public manager with an uncertain cost parameter yields a higher welfare.
By contrast, when concession candidates have no ex-ante information, they o¤er shorter
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concession periods because they all bid the concession period at which they can expect to
break even.
By quantifying our previous results Table 1 also provides new insights on the trade-
o¤ at hand. First, under ex-ante asymmetric information and competitive auctions, the
theoretical shadow cost of public funds falls to zero for high cost uncertainty (ant1 = 0 for
large enough intervals [0; ]) so that BOT concessions are always optimal. The government
indeed benets from a strong sampling e¤ect in the concession auctions because it can
select the best concession holders amongst an innite set of candidates whereas it is not
able to do so under public management. Second, under ex-ante symmetric information
and cost transferability, BOT concessions are more often preferred when the share of
investment costs falls (st increases with K). This is because less costly projects imply
shorter concession periods and faster transfers of cost characteristics and information. The
social cost of too high prices during a short concession period is much smaller than the
social cost of the permanent rents accrued to the publicly managed rm. Third, although
as predicted above, BOT concessions are more often preferred under revenue auctions
(rev < snt),22 the gain of revenue auctions is tiny and is very likely to vanish when
the additional cost of monitoring the revenue ows in concessions is taken into account.
The exibility in concession periods to guarantee of a xed amount of revenues does not
signicantly inuence the decision to implement a BOT concession. Finally, more risky
projects are more likely to be granted a BOT concession. Indeed, all theoretical values
fall with larger cost uncertainty (larger intervals [0; ]). This is because a larger cost
uncertainty strengthens information asymmetries between governments and public rms
managers. The latter then have a larger scope to inate their cost reports and capture
information rents.
22Those thresholds are equal only because of the 2-digit rounding.
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5 Extensions
So far we have considered BOT concessions that were totally unregulated and that all
parties shared the same opportunity cost of time. In practice many BOT concessions
are subject to some price control. For example, many governments constrain toll road
concessions with price caps. In the water treatment projects implemented in developing
countries, most concession holders own the private water treatment plants and deliver
drinkable water at a xed price per cubic meter, a price that is set by the government
before the concession period.23 In Subsection 5.1, we extend our previous discussion of
BOT concessions to the existence of price caps or regulated prices.
Another concern is that, in practice, governmentsand rmsopportunity costs of time
signicantly di¤er. The nature of the opportunity cost of time depends on two aspects.
First, the opportunity cost of time may be associated with the opportunity cost of capital
for which governments and rms face di¤erent restrictions. On the one hand, it is often
argued that governments get better lending conditions than concession holders because
they hold more diversied portfolios of projects, have recourse to taxation for interest
payment and therefore face no bankruptcy risks. On the other hand, governments face
numerous credit restrictions imposed by the supra-governmental institutions or the tax
payers to which they are accountable. For instance, the Maastricht Treaty imposes limits
on national debts and decits of E.U. member states; the I.M.F. restricts the debt posi-
tions of many developing countries and even of some developed countries since the 2008
nancial crisis; and similarly, national governments restrict the debt capacity of regional
and municipal agencies. Second, the opportunity cost of time may also be associated
with the time span of the public and private decision makers. In democracies, politicians
have short and uncertain tenures and therefore tend to highly discount the future costs
and benets of public projects. Similarly, rmsmanagers and their shareholders are also
sometimes tagged for their short-term view. Hence, the ways in which politicians and
private rms discount the future depend on the situation of each country and concession
23The payment of water consumption to the concession holder is generally made by non-prot agencies
that distribute the water and pass through the prices to the users. We thank A. Blanc for this comment.
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sector. Subsection 5.2 analyzes the impact of di¤erent opportunity costs of time on the
choice of a concession.
5.1 Price Caps
In this subsection we study the e¤ect of a price cap regulation on the choice for BOT
concession contracts. Intuitively, price caps increase the consumer surplus during the
concession period at the cost of a longer concession duration. It turns out that the rise
in consumer surplus dominates if the price caps is appropriately chosen.
For the sake of conciseness, we focus on the set-up discussed in Subsection 4.2.1 where
both the government and concession holder share the same information at the time they
sign the concession contract and where cost characteristics are not transferable at the
term of the concession. Price caps can be introduced in a similar way in the other set-
ups studied in the paper. Suppose that, before the contract is signed, an independent
regulation agency exogenously sets a price cap equal to p. Note that too low price caps
can lead to service breakdown when p < . In this case, the concession holder makes
a contemporaneous loss and has incentives to shut her service down. As a result, the
private concession holder and the government have incentives to renegotiate. For the
sake of simplicity, we abstract from renegociation issues by assuming that the price cap
is always high enough: p  .The main issue is here that the concession holder may not
be able to recoup her investment cost although she is never put in position to shut down.
The concession holder is constrained to set a price no higher than p for the whole
concession period. If p is higher than the monopoly price P (Qm()), the concession
holder is able to set the monopoly price and the output and surplus are given by Qm()
and S(Qm()). The contemporaneous prot and welfare during the concession are then
equal to (P (Qm)  )Qm and W (Qm; ) as in the previous sections. A more interesting
situation occur when the price cap p binds. Then, the demand reaches the level Q that
solves P (Q) = p and the consumer surplus is given by S(Q). The contemporaneous prot
and welfare during the concession are equal to
 
P
 
Q
  Q and W  Q; . Let c be
the threshold level so that the price cap just binds. This cost level solves the equality
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p = P (Qm(c)). Concession holders with cost higher than this level are constrained by
the price cap.
The concession duration, which makes the concession holder indi¤erent to invest ex-
ante, is equal to
Lcap =
K
E>c

(P
 
Q
  )Q+ Ec [(P (Qm)  )Qm]
where the denominator expresses the concession holders expected prot. The latter is
equal to the sum of the expected prot for costs higher than c, E>c

P
 
Q
  Q and
the expected prot for costs lower than c, Ec [(P (Qm)  )Qm]. The government
prefers public management over the BOT concession with a price cap p if and only if
Wp  Wcap. After some algebraic manipulations, this inequality is equivalent to
E
h
W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp  W (Qm; )
i
 E>c

W (Q; ) W (Qm; ) (24)
The LHS has the same expression as in the condition (18) that applies with no price cap.
It decreases with larger  from a positive value at  = 0, has a root at snt and tends to
 1 when ! +1 (see Appendix Proof of Proposition 2).
The main question here is whether the government prefers BOT concessions more often
in the presence of a price cap or not. Comparing (24) with (18), it is readily observed
that BOT concessions are preferred if the RHS of condition (24) is positive. Because the
latter is a decreasing function of , it is positive for any   cap where the threshold
cap  E>c

S(Q)  Q  E>c [S(Qm)  Qm]
E>c [P (Qm)Qm   Qm]  E>c

P (Q)Q  Q
is the root of the above RHS. We can therefore infer that the implementation of a price
cap favors the choice for a BOT concession if and only if snt  cap. This requires that
the threshold cap is positive and su¢ ciently large. The threshold cap reects the e¤ects
of the price cap on net surplus and concession period. On the one hand, the positive
denominator expresses the concession holder loss in expected operational prots and
therefore the extension of the concession period caused by the price cap. On the other
hand, the numerator represent the net surplus gain that the price cap permits during
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the concession period. This numerator is positive because the net surplus S(Q)   Q is
an increasing function of Q for all Q 2 Qm(); Q; indeed, it has a derivative equal to
P (Q)    which is positive given that p = P (Q)  . Hence the implementation of a
price cap favors the choice for a BOT concession when the expected net surplus under
price cap is su¢ ciently larger than the expected net surplus under laissez-faire. Since the
size of the net surplus gain depends on cost uncertainty, such a condition is likely to be
satised when the range of costs is not too wide. By contrast, if this condition is not
satised, the price cap, which cannot be adapted to each cost realization, may become
a too rigid instrument and increases too much the concession period. Indeed, if the cost
uncertainty becomes large, the expected net gain E>c

S(Q)  Q diminishes, which
makes public management more favorable for the government.
To sum up, the presence of an exogenous price cap does not alter previous results. It
entices governments to prefer further BOT concessions when it is appropriately set and
cost uncertainty is not too strong. This result partly hinges on our simplifying assumption
about renegotiation: a too high price cap is likely be renegotiated, for instance, into a
cost plus contract, which complicates the above discussion.We now turn to the discussion
of opportunity costs of time for governments and concession holders.
5.2 Asymmetric Opportunity Costs of Time
So far we have assumed that governments and concession holders had the same opportu-
nity cost of time . We now analyze the impact of di¤erent opportunity costs of time on
the choice of a concession. For the sake of conciseness, we extend the model discussed in
Sections 3 and 4.2, which focuses on ex-ante symmetric information and non transferable
cost. Other cases can easily be discussed in a similar way.
We assume that the governmentsand concession holdersopportunity costs of time
are given by G and F , respectively. Let the concession termination time be again t1. As
governments and concession holders discount time di¤erently, they have di¤erent duration
measures: LG(t1)=G =
R t1
0
e Gtdt and LF (t1)=F =
R t1
0
e F tdt. The governments
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objectives under public management and BOT concession are given by
GWp =   (1 + ) GK + E [W (Q; )  U ]
GWb =  GK + LG E [S(Q1)  Q1] + (1  LG) E [W (Q2; )  U ]
It is instructive to rstly discuss the case of symmetric information. In this case,
the concession holder bids for the concession termination time t1 that solves LF (t1) =
FK=[P (Q
m)Qm   Qm]. Under public management, the rm manager obtains no rent
(U = 0) and implements the optimal output Q. The government prefers public manage-
ment over the BOT concession if and only if Wp  Wb, or equivalently,
LG (t1) fW (Q; )  [S(Qm)  Qm]g  GK (25)
This inequality reects the same trade-o¤ between governments cost and benet of a
public management as before. The main di¤erence lies in the fact that the government
does not discount time in the same way as concession holders: LG (t1) 6= LF (t1). Let
T  K=[P (Qm)Qm Qm] > 0 be the payback period, which measures the time to recover
the investment cost in the absence of time discounting and which is therefore independent
of opportunity costs of time. After some algebraic manipulations, the inequality (25)
becomes
W (Q; ) W (Qm; )  K
T
[ (G; F ; T )  1] (26)
where
 (G; F ; T )  LF (t1) =F
LG (t1) =G
=
G
F
FT
1  (1  FT )G=F
The second equality stems from the facts that the concession durations LF (t1) is equal
to FT and that the concession durations LF (t1) =
R t1
0
e F tdt and LG (t1) =
R t1
0
e Gtdt
satisfy the equality [1  LG (t1)]G = [1  LF (t1)]F . The function  is independent from
 and is larger than 1 if and only if G  F . Moreover it increases with larger G and
smaller F .
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The inequality (26) allows us to determine the governments optimal choice under
symmetric information. Note rst that the RHS inequality (26) increases with larger 
if and only if   1, or equivalently, G  F . Second, the LHS is positive at  = 0
and decreases with larger  because (d=d)LHS= [P (Q)Q   Q]  [P (Qm)Qm   Qm]
is negative and tends to 0 since Q > Qm for all  and Q ! Qm at  ! 1. As a
result, if G < F (i.e.  < 1), the inequality (26) is satised for all  so that BOT
concessions are never preferred by governments. By contrast, if G  F .(i.e.   1), the
inequality (26) is fullled for small  but cannot be satised for large enough . There
then exists a unique threshold for the shadow cost of public funds, denoted o, such that
BOT concessions are preferred if and only if   o. Because the function  increases
with larger G and smaller F , the threshold o falls with larger G and smaller F .
This result contrasts with the discussion presented in Section 3 where governments
and concession holders had symmetric opportunity costs of time. In this case, there was
no scope for BOT concession contracts because the government could always replicate the
concession holders output decision and improve it. Here BOT concessions might become
a better option for the government if the latter has a larger opportunity costs of time
than the private sector. The incentives to grant BOT concessions are stronger for a more
impatient or nancially strapped government because the latter puts a higher weight on
the short term cost of investment and a lower weight on the consumers future losses. The
government has therefore higher incentives to grant the project to a private concession
holder at the cost of future price distortions.
This discussion extends to the case of information asymmetry between governments
and concession holders. Indeed, under asymmetric information, a concession holder bids
LoF =
FK
E [P (Qm)Qm   Qm] :
The expected value of governments objective under BOT is given by
GWb =  GK + LoG E [S(Qm)  Qm] + (1  LoG)E

W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp

:
Let T o = K=E[P (Qm)Qm Qm] > 0 be the expected payback period under asymmetric
information. After the same algebraic manipulations as above, the government prefers
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public management over the BOT concession if and only if
E

W (Qp; )  G()
g()
Qp  W (Qm; )

 K
T o
[ (G; F ; T
o)  1] : (27)
We apply the same argument as in the case of symmetric information with the di¤erence
that the LHS can here become negative for large . We establish the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Let G and F denote the opportunity cost of time of the government and
the private concession holder respectively. Under asymmetric information, there exists
a function oG(F ) and a threshold 
o such that BOT concessions are preferred to public
management if and only if G  oG(F ) and   o. The threshold o falls with larger
G and smaller F while oG(F ) < F :
Proof. See Appendix F.
Compared to the previous benchmark case, information asymmetry strengthens the
incentives to choose a BOT concession. In particular, governments need not be more
impatient than the concession holder to grant a BOT concessions. Indeed, when G 2
[oG(F ); F ], BOT concession are the best options for governments under asymmetric
information whereas they are not under symmetric information. It remains that more
impatient governments have more incentives to opt for BOT concessions because they
put a higher weight on the short term cost of investment than on the benet of a larger
consumer surplus during the concession period. Since governments that face high public
decits and tight budget constraints have simultaneously a large  and a large G, we
expect them to favor BOT concessions. This result may o¤er an explanation about why
BOT concessions blossomed at the time of the industrial revolution. It also suggests that
we should not be surprised to see a new wave of BOT concession contracts in countries
that have recently faced a severe budgetary crisis.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the choice between build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions
and public management when governments and rm managers do not share the same in-
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formation regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. The analysis highlights the
trade-o¤ that exists between the public cost of nancing the construction and operation of
a facility and the loss of consumer surplus that the higher prices set by concession holders
generate. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds, larger business risk and infor-
mation asymmetries increase governmentsincentives to choose BOT concessions. Such
a result also applies in the case of concessions operating under regulated prices. Price
caps increase governmentsincentives to choose BOT concession contracts if they are set
appropriately and if the cost uncertainty is not too large. We also show that the use
of least-present-value-of-revenue auctions does not signicantly alter governments choice
for a BOT concession. Those theoretical results have some practical relevance. Using
the class of linear demand functions and uniform cost distributions, we show that govern-
ments are likely to favor BOT concession contracts for relevant values of shadow costs of
public funds in both advanced and developing countries.
We show that BOT concessions are more likely to outperform public management in
projects where government and rms face the same uncertainty about their protability
at the time of the concession signature and where the project characteristics can be
transferred at the end of the concession. The possibility to transfer project characteristics
gives governments additional incentives to choose BOT concessions because the transfer
of project characteristics reduces the informational asymmetry between the government
and its public manager after the concession period. This result helps to explain why BOT
concessions are so popular for transport infrastructures, where all parties nd it di¢ cult
to predict tra¢ c and costs, and where cost and demand characteristics are naturally
transmitted to the public sector at the end of the concession. To give a grasp of the
importance of such projects, we note that half of the 4,300 projects reported in the
World Bank database on the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) are concessions
of the type discussed in this paper. Among those concessions the majority (i.e., 1040
projects) are transport infrastructure projects. 24 Similarly, in advanced economies, BOT
24The other concessions are in energy (699 projects), and in water and sewerage (552 projects). The
PPI Project Database covers projects in 137 low-and middle-income countries, in the energy, telecom-
munications, transport, and water and sewerage sectors. We add the number of BOT concessions, with
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concessions are primarily used to nance transport infrastructure. For instance in the
United Kingdom, half of the 48.3 billion of pounds of BOT projects that had been signed
between 1992 and 2006, were in transport (see Barrie 2006).25
Another situation where BOT concessions might outperform public management is
when the government faces a large number of specialized corporations. To overcome its
lack of expertise, the government may organize an auction to extract the concession hold-
ersknow-how and limit their informational rents. We show that the ex-ante information
asymmetry between the government and concession candidates favors its choice for a BOT
concession, provided that the auctions attract a su¢ ciently large numbers of participants.
It is not enough that the private sector has e¢ cient technology and low cost to make it
the best option. In addition, it is necessary that competition for the concession reduces
the cost of asymmetric information. The choice for a BOT concession contract over public
management therefore depends on the number of bidders. This result helps to explain the
French experience in the water sector that includes mostly concession contracts in large
cities, and public management in rural areas. In large cities, several major rms compete
to win the auction, while much fewer ones compete in low density area. Rural areas are
hence publicly managed, which conrms our analysis. The lack of ex-ante competition
undermines the benet of outsourcing the service to the private sector.
Finally, our analysis shows that BOT concession contracts are more likely to be imple-
mented when concession decisions are made by politicians who have higher opportunity
costs of time than concession holders. When governments are more impatient they favor
more often BOT concessions. Unexpectedly, the recent progress of democratic values in
the world might thus have contributed to the success of BOT concessions in newly demo-
the number of Build Rehabilitate Operate and Transfer, Rehabilitate Operate and Transfer, Rehabilitate
Lease or Rent and Transfer concessions, since they all share the theoretical characteristics of the model.
25In rich countries BOT concessions have hence been used to nance highways and toll roads (e.g., in
France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the UK, and the US), tunnels (e.g., the Channel Tunnel Rail Link between
England and France, the Port of Miami tunnel), airports (e.g., Abu Dhabi International Airport, Gatwick
Airport), ports (e.g., in Adelaide, St Petersburg), bridges (e.g., the Golden Ears Bridge in Canada, the
Baldwin County Bridge in Alabama, the Chicago Skyway Bridge), or railways (e.g., the automatic light
metro line in Seoul, the high-speed train portion between Bordeaux and Tours in France).
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cratic countries because their politicians may discount the future more heavily than their
former entrenched dictators. Similarly, by emphasizing the trade-o¤ that exists between
allocative e¢ ciency and the cost of public funds, we show that BOT concessions are par-
ticularly relevant in time of budgetary crisis, as faced today by many countries. These
are periods where the opportunity cost of public funds rise sharply and unexpectedly,
favoring BOT concession over public management. Further research is welcome on those
new topics.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let 
b() = E [W (Qm; )] = E [S(Qm) + P (Qm)Qm   (1 + ) Qm] and let

p() = E
h
W (Qp; )  G
g
Qp
i
= E
h
S(Qp) + P (Qp)Qp   (1 + ) Qp   G
g
Qp
i
. We
know from the discussion in the main text that 
b(0) < 
p(0). Simply di¤erentiating

b() we have (d=d) 
b() = E [P (Qm)Qm   Qm]. Applying the envelop theorem (see
(13)), we get (d=d) 
p() = E
h
P (Qp)Qp   Qp   G
g
Qp
i
. Because Qm maximizes the
operational prot P (Q)Q Q, we have that P (Qm)Qm Qm  P (Qp)Qp Qp for all
. Therefore, (d=d)
 

b

> (d=d) (
p) + c where c is a strictly positive constant larger
than minE
h
G
g
Qp
i
= E
h
G
g
lim!1Qp
i
> 0. As a result, 
b() begins below 
p(0) and
rises faster than 
p(). So, it exists snt > 0 so that 
b() > 
p() for  > snt.
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Note rstly that by virtue of equation (13) when  ! 1, we have Q !
Qm and W (Q; ) ! W (Qm; ). So, the second term in the right hand side of (19)
vanishes and Proposition 2 applies. As a result we can conclude that the BOT project is
preferred for large enough . Note secondly that when  = 0, Qp ! Q and inequality
(19) reduces to E [W (Q; )] > E [W (Qm; )] which is always true. Therefore, it must
be that st > 0. Note nally, that at  = snt we have E
h
W (Qp; )  sntG
g
Qp
i
=
E [W (Qm; )]. So, inequality (19) can not be satised at snt. Therefore, it must be
that st < snt. Finally we prove that st is unique. Let 
b() = E [W (Qm; )] +
(1  L) fE [W (Q; )]  E [W (Qm; )]g = (1  L)E [W (Q; )] + LE [W (Qm; )]. Let

p() = E
h
W (Qp; )  G
g
Qp
i
, which can be re-written as 
p() = (1  L)E[W (Qp; )
 G
g
Qp] + LE
h
W (Qp; )  G
g
Qp
i
. We can break down the di¤erence 
p   
b in two
terms

p()  
b() = (1  L)

E

W (Qp; )  G
g
Qp

  E [W (Q; )]

+ L

E

W (Qp; )  G
g
Qp

  E [W (Qm; )]

where L does not depend on . From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that the second
term is decreasing in . The rst term is also decreasing in . Indeed, it is clearly smaller
than zero and, using the envelop theorem, it has a slope that is proportional to
E

P (Qp)Qp   Qp   G
g
Qp

  E [P (Q)Q   Q)]
This is negative for  = 0 and  ! 1. To prove that this slope is always negative, let
v   + 
1+
G
g
> . Then, we have Qp() = Q(v) and we can write the above slope asZ 

[P (Q (v))Q (v)  vQ (v)] g () d   1
1 + 
Z 

G
g
Qp () g () d
 
Z 

[P (Q)Q   Q)] g () d
where the rst term is smaller than the last one. Hence this expression is negative.
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We rank the concession candidates according to their cost parameters; that is,
1  2  :::  N . So, the winner of the auction is the concession holder i = 1 who
is granted a concession of duration L2. This concession holder will set the monopoly
output Qm1 = Q
m(1). Let g1(1) be the probability density that the winner has a
cost  = 1; that is, Prob[1   < 1 + d1] = g1(1)d1. Because there are N
possibilities that a bidder beats has all others, we have g1(1)  Ng(1) [1 G(1)]N 1.
Let g2(2) be the probability that the second best bidder has a cost  = 2; equivalently
Prob[2   < 2 + d2] = g2(2)d2. Also, because there are N(N   1) pairs of two
bidders such that the second bidder looses against the rst one and beats all the other
N  2 bidders, we get g2(2)  N(N  1)g(2)G(2) [1 G(2)]N 2. When N = 1, we set
2 =  and we use the cumulative distribution G2(2) = 0 if 2 2 [0; ) and G2(2) = 0 if
2 = . Let g12(1; 2) be the joint probability density that the winner has a cost 1 and
the second best bidder has a cost 2 so that Prob[1   < 1 + d1 and 2   <
2 + d2] = g12(1; 2) d1d2. Let the respective expectation operators be denoted by
E2 [h (2)] 
R 

h (2) g2 (2) d2 and E12 [h (1; 2)] 
R 

R 

h (1; 2) g12 (1; 2) d1d2.
Let again 
p() = E
h
W (Qp; )  G
g
Qp
i
. We prove that ant exists and is unique by
showing that
W()    Wp  Wb =  K  E12 [L2 (S(Qm1 )  1Qm1 )] + E2 [L2] 
p()
is strictly a decreasing function of in  and that it admits at most one root.
First note that E12 [L2 (S(Qm1 )  1Qm1 )] is independent of  because Qm1 and L2 are
independent of it. The properties of W() are determined by those of 
p(). So,
(d=d) W() =  K+E2 [L2] (d=d) 
p() and (d2=d2) W() = E2 [L2] (d2=d2) 
p().
Second, note that W is convex in  because 
p() is also convex in . We indeed
get
(d=d) 
p() = E [P (Qp)Qp   Qp  QpG()=g()]
and, applying the envelope theorem on equation (13), we further get that 
d2=d2


p() = E f  (dQp=d) [(G()=g())  P 0(Qp)Qp]g = [(1 + )]
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which is positive because dQp=d < 0 and P 0(Q) < 0.
Third, we show that 
p() and therefore W() are decreasing functions of  for all
  0 if and only if
C1: E [m (v)] E2

m (2)
 1 < 1
Indeed, becauseW is convex, (d=d) W is a increasing function of . Hence, (d=d) W
is negative for all   0 if lim!+1 (d=d) W  0. We can compute that lim!+1 (d=d) W
=  K+E2[L2]Em (v) where m ()  Qm()
h
P (Qm()) 
i
and v  +G()=g().
Because L2 = K=m (2), we have that (d=d) W  0 if and only if C1 is satised.
Fourth, under C1, we show that W has at most one positive root. Indeed, W is
a decreasing function of . So, W has no root if lim!0 W  0 and a unique root other-
wise, where lim!0 W is equal toW0   E12 [L2 (S(Qm1 )  1Qm1 )]+E2 [L2]E [W (Qo; )]
where Qo = lim!0Q
. This proves the proposition.
Finally, we prove that su¢ cient condition for condition C1 is that E [v]  . When
the number of bidders is N = 1, the distribution of 2 collapses to a Dirac distribution
centered on 2 =  whereas it collapses to one centered on 2 =  when N ! +1: Hence,
for any given law of 2 we must have that m()  E2 [m(2)]  m() and similarly
that m()  E2 [m(2) 1]  m() 1. Using the last inequality, a su¢ cient condition
for C1 is therefore E [m (v)] m() 1 < 1, or equivalently, E [m (v)] < m(). Applying
the Jensen inequality to the convex function of prots m (), the latter condition is
satised if m (E [v])  m(), which is equivalent to the condition E [v]   because
m() is a decreasing function of . For instance, this condition is always satised for
uniform distribution on [; ] because v = 2    and E [v] = .
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Let again W =   Wp  Wb and 
p() = E hW (Qp; )  G
g
Qp
i
. Let now
Z(;N)  W snt  Want so that
Z(;N) = Lsnt f
p()  E [S(Qm)  Qm]g
  fE2 [L2] 
p()  E12 [L2 (S(Qm1 )  1Qm1 )]g
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Under condition C1, W are decreasing functions that accept at most one positive root.
Therefore, snt  ant if and only if one of the following conditions hold: Z(;N)  0 for
all , Z(snt; N)  0 or Z(ant; N)  0.
First, snt < ant for N = 1. Indeed, for N = 1 we have 2 = , E12 [h(1; 2)] =
E

h(; )

and E2 [h(2)] = h(). So, Lsnt = (E [m()])
 1 and E2 [L2] =
 
m()
 1
.
Therefore,
Z(snt; 1) = (E [m()]) 1 
p(snt)  E [S(Qm)  Qm]	
   m() 1 
p(snt)  E [(S(Qm)  Qm)]	
is negative because (E [m()]) 1 <
 
m()
 1
and because, by (17), at snt,Wp Wb = 0
() 
p()  E [S(Qm)  Qm] = sntK=Lsnt > 0
Second, snt > ant for N !1. For N !1; we have 1 = 2 =  so that
Z(snt;1) = (E [m()]) 1 
p(snt)  E [S(Qm)  Qm]	
   m() 1 
p(snt)   S(Qm  )  Qm  	
is positive because (E [m()]) 1 >
 
m()
 1
and S(Qm
 


)   Qm   > E[S(Qm)
 Qm] whereas, by (17), at snt, Wp  Wb = 0 () 
p(snt)   E [S(Qm)  Qm] =
sntK=Lsnt > 0
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. For a least net present value of revenue auction, the expression (23) writes as
E

L1(;R)


p()  
b()	 > 0 (28)
where 
p() = W (Qp; )   G()
g()
Qp and 
b() = E [W (Qm; )] are the values used in
the proof to Proposition 2. We here show that the expression in this condition falls from
positive values to negative value as  rises from zero to innity. Indeed, from the proof of
Proposition 2, we know that (d=d)
 

b

> (d=d) (
p). So that this inequality falls with
larger . At  = 0; we get that 
p(0)! W (Q; ) which is larger than 
b(0) = W (Qm; )
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for any . For !1; using v1() =  +G()=g()   and Qp1() = Qm(v1()), the
LHS of inequality becomes
E

L1(;R)

[P (Qp1())  ]Qp1() 
G()
g()
Qp1   [P (Qm())  ]Qm()

and, it can be written as
E fL1(;R) [[P (Qm(v1()))  v1()]Qm(v1())  [P (Qm())  ]Qm()]g
This is negative because v1   and therefore [P (Qm(v()))  v()]Qm(v()) 
[P (Qm())  ]Qm() for any .
Appendix F: Linear example
Under linear demands and uniform cost distributions, the monopoly output and prices
are given by Qm() = (1  ) =2 and P (Qm()) = (1 + )=2. Under public management
we get Qp () = (1 + ) = (1 + 2)   . Cumbersome calculations yield the following
thresholds when the government has no ex-ante information disadvantage:
snt =
q

2
+ 9=   9  3 + 2
6
 
1  
st =
q
36K
 
1    +  3  22 2     3  2
6
 
1   
When the government has an information disadvantage, the number of potential bid-
ders N has important implications. We consider the two polar situations where the gov-
ernment faces either a single applicant (N = 1) or an innite set of applicants (N !1,
i.e. perfectly competitive auction). It is intuitive that the former situation yields a smaller
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welfare benet of BOT concessions. We get
ant1 = max
26640; 12  5  
r
3

44  24 + 32

4
3775
ant1 = max
240;
q
3
 
6      9  4
4
 
3  2
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We nally compare the xed duration concession with the least net present value of
revenue auction. In the least net present value of revenue auction we get
R = K=
"
1 
Z 
0

P (Qm())
1

d
#
= K=

1  2 + 2 ln   + 1
while L1(;R)= = R=[P (Qm())Qm()]
=
4K
(1 + ) (1  )
"
1 
Z 
0

(1 + )=2
1

d
# 1
=
4K
(1 + ) (1  )

1  2 + 2 ln   + 1 1
The condition
R 
0
L1(;R)= [W (Q
p; )  Qp  W (Qm; )] d  0 becomesZ 
0
(122 + 8+ 1) 2 + ( 82   8  2)  + 1
1  2 d  0
This expression accepts one root rev
rev =
8 log
 
 + 1
  8  p 
4

6 + log
 
1    5 log   + 1
where   = 64

log
 
 + 1
  2 4 12 + 2 log  1    10 log   + 1     2 log   + 1.
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The LHS of the inequality (27) is a decreasing function of  and has a bounded
negative slope lim!1(LHS=) (see proof of Proposition 2). Leto < 1 solves lim!1(LHS=) =
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(K=T o) (o   1). As a result, if  < o, the inequality (27) is never fullled whereas,
if   o, it is not fullled for  = 0 but it is satised for large enough . Therefore
there exists a threshold o such that BOT concessions are preferred if   o. Let the
function oG(F ) solves the equality  (G; F ; T
o) = o. Then   o is equivalent to
G  oG(F ). Note that oG(F ) < F because o < 1. Finally the threshold o falls with
larger G and smaller F because  increases with larger G and smaller F .
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Figure 1 : Welfare under BOT and Public Management 
